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Abstract 
 In Africa, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) were initially established to 
tackle the economic challenges of the continent. However, overtime, they expanded their 
mandate to deal with the security threats of the continent such as terrorism. In fact, the fight 
against terrorism has been internationalized following the September 9/11 terrorist attack in 
the U.S.A.  Since then, RECs have been giving considerable attention to preventing and 
combating terrorism in their respective regions. Similarly, IGAD has been involved in 
preventing and combating terrorism. So far, however, little has been done with regard to what 
IGAD has performed in fighting terrorism. Therefore, this study was intended to describe and 
analyze the legal and practical activities carried out by IGAD in its fight against terrorism in 
the region general and in Somalia in particular. Both descriptive and analytical methods were 
employed and data were analyzed through qualitative approach. Finally, based on the 
findings, the study argues that, instead of overreliance on hard power as a means of fighting 
terrorism, IGAD should invest more on the political and socio-economic problems of its 
member states so as to address the root causes. 
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The Genesis of Regional Economic Communities in Africa  
 The idea and practice of regional integration in Africa is not a new phenomenon. 
Africa has a long track record of economic cooperation and regional integration since 
independence in the 1960s (Bourenance, 2002). The changing nature of the international trade 
due to the globalization of the world economy has increased the urgency of economic 
cooperation and integration among African countries to gain a large share and benefits from 
the international trade. 
 The urgency for regional economic communities in Africa has been reinforced by 
both external and internal factors (Memar, 2012). Externally, the end of the Cold War and the 
acceleration of the globalization process, along with Africa‘s risk of further marginalization 
from the global market, presented the establishment of regional economic communities 
(RECs) as an imperative. According to Okoth (2004), the emergence of a strong desire to 
have regional economic communities was a clear response to the events of the end of the 
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Cold war. In fact, in Africa, there had been regional economic communities such as the 
 Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC) and Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) prior to the culmination of the Cold War,  
 Internally, the proliferation of intra-state conflicts in Africa following the withdrawal 
of the then Super powers (the U.S.A and U.S.S.R), necessitated the establishment of RECs as 
the only mechanism to handle the security matters of the continent. The prevalence of bad 
governance, human rights violation, poverty, humanitarian catastrophe and environmental 
degradation presented the argument that RECs are the essential vehicle to address these key 
challenges by promoting maximum mobilization of regional resources while minimizing 
external dependence. There was also a recognition that regionalism could create a 
springboard for economic liberalization and fee movement of labour which would enable 
neighbouring countries to deepen commercial ties and to solidify their economies through 
harmonization of polices for mutual benefits and joint regional development. 
 The imperatives of RECs has also to do with the dynamism and the complexity of the 
global economy, as an instrument to increase flow of investment and to promote economic 
growth through better leverage in international trading (Ndomo, 2009). It also offers the 
opportunity to broaden national markets and production scales; and to advance trade in 
services and inter-regional investments. According to the first report of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), regional integration provides a number of 
opportunities which includes but not limited to sustainability; increased foreign and domestic 
investment; increased global competitiveness; promotion of regional public goods; prevent 
conflict; consolidation of economic and political reforms (ECA, 2004). 
 The genesis of a concerted effort to integrate the African continent economically can 
be traced directly to the Lagos Plan of Action and to the OAU Charter. This effort resulted in 
the adoption of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (The Abuja 
Treaty) in June 1991. The Abuja Treaty recognizes RECs as the only viable means to 
overcome underdevelopment and the security challenges of the continent (The Abuja Treaty, 
1991). It emphasis, in one way or another, the need for regional integration given ―the nature 
of Africa‘s economies, which, being small and fragmented, stand to enjoy a variety of 
economic benefits that would come from integration, in addition to becoming a stronger voice 
in international economic decision-making‖ (Janneh, 2012). 
 The African Economic Community (AEC) was established as an integral part of the 
OAU with the primary objective of promoting the integration of African economies. In this 
regard, Chapter XIX of the treaty emphasizes the importance of establishing the AEC 
―through the coordination, harmonization, and progressive integration of the activities of 
regional economic communities‖ (Abuja Treaty, 1991). It further underscores that member 
states have the responsibility ―to promote the coordination and harmonization of the 
integration activities of regional economic communities of which they are members with the 
activities of the community‖ (Ibid, 1991). In addition, Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union also recognizes the need ―to coordinate and harmonize the policies between 
the existing and the future RECs for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union‖ 
(AU Constitutive Act, 2002). 
 However, multiplicity of membership, lack of political commitment coupled with 
ineffective organizational structure and regulatory policies have impeded their success and 
the delivery of expected outcomes. In this regard, Naceur Bourenane has summarized 
constraints which have been hindering the process of regional integration in Africa into six 
categories. These are: i) infrastructural constraints; ii) institutional constraints, which refers to 
organizational matters and choice of economic policy;  iii) constraints related to country‘s 
economic structure; iv) those concerning the international environment and its changes; v) 
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constraints linked to the players involved and their strategies; and vi) conflicts. Among other 
things, lack of well established infrastructures continue to be the biggest challenge of the 
RECs which has been obstructing the expansion of cross-border regional trade and the 
deepening of economic integration  by combating security threats such as terrorism and 
piracy. Although the challenges differ from region to region, terrorism, for instance, have 
been the most challenging security threats of IGAD. 
 
Regional Economic Communities and the Fight Against Terrorism 
 The fight against terrorism came to be an international phenomenon following the 
Sep. 9/11 terrorist attack on the U.S.A. Since then, international and regional economic 
communities have taken the issues of combating terrorism as a priority in their efforts to 
maintain international peace and security. For example, the UN has introduced various legal 
and institutional counter-terrorism mechanisms to fight against terrorism. In addition, the UN 
security Council through its 1373 (2011) resolution recognized and mandated RECs as a 
viable means of battling terrorism due to its transnational nature (Rosand and etal., 2008). 
Following that, several RECs established legal and institutional regimes within the context of 
their regional peace and security frameworks to prevent and combat terrorism. Besides, they 
have also developed counter-terrorism strategy that reflects the terrorist threat posed by 
international and/or regional terrorist organizations within their own regional contexts.  
 Although the target was the U.S.A, it was after the 1998 attack in the U.S embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania that took the life of many Africans that Africa became alerted to 
international terrorism. It seems for this reasons that, the then OAU adopted the ―Convention 
on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism‖ in 1999. The convention was later supported by 
Protocols and Institutional Mechanisms. ―The AU Plan of Action‖ adopted in 2002, provided 
a framework and road map for RECs and African Stats to implement international counter-
terrorism measures as provided in the OAU Convention, as well the measures mandated by 
the UN Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) (OSAA, 2006). Following that, several of 
Africa‘s sub-regional RECs involved in Peace and Security Programs. However, out of the 
eight RECs, only IGAD and ECOWAS ―--have established significant counter-terrorism 
capacity building programs in each of their respective regions for the benefit of their 
members‖ (OSAA, 2006:37).  In the following section, we shall see how IGAD evolved and 
incorporated combating terrorism as part of its mandate.  
 
The origin of IGAD  
 The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established in 1996 
to supersede the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) 
which was created in 1986. The original founding members of the organization were Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. Later on, Eritrea became the seventh member of the 
Authority in Addis Ababa in 1993 (IGAD, 1996). However, it withdrew from its membership 
in 1998. In 2011 South Sudan admitted as a new member to the Authority. Initially, IGADD 
was created to mobilize and coordinate resources of member states to prevent the spread of 
drought, famine and desertification.  
 Later on, the organization was revitalized into a full-fledged regional political, 
economic and security entity in the mid-1990s. This time, member countries recognized that 
economic development and regional integration could not be achieved without the existence 
of perpetual peace and security in the region. Consequently, they transformed the 
organization and expanded its mandate to incorporate wide array of regional issues especially 
in areas of conflict prevention, management and resolution in 1995 (Kinfe, 2007).  
 The role of IGAD in conflict prevention, management and resolution had shown 
significant progress when it carried out conflict resolution and mediation attempts in the 
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Sudan and Somalia. IGAD also attempted to mediate Ethiopia and Eritrea during the 1998-
2000 war (Lata, 2007:12) although they remained to date in a state of no-war no-peace 
situation. The ultimate objective of IGAD is to achieve economic cooperation and integration 
by averting the destructive energies of conflict into regional cooperation and development 
(IGAD, 1996). It also aims to harmonize the policies of member countries in order to 
maintain lasting peace and security in the region. To achieve these objectives, it has 
established four hierarchical and complementary operational structures which include the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Committee of 
Ambassadors and the Secretariat (Ibid, 1996).  
 The IGAD region has been the most conflict and terrorism torn zone in the world. 
Since the 1998 terrorist attack on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania fighting 
terrorism has been one of the international obligations of IGAD. Following the adoption of 
the Draft Implementation Plan to Counter Terrorism in 2003, IGAD has taken a more 
proactive role in strengthening cooperation against terrorism and transnational organized 
crime in region (CGCC and ISSP, 2012). 
 
Conceptualizing Terrorism 
 There is no concept as controversial as terrorism.Its meaning has been a bone of 
contention among scholars and politicians since antiquities. It did not start with the demise of 
the Soviet Union or with the horrors of September 9/11. It has deep roots in history.  
 The term terrorism entered in the English language at the time of the 1789 French 
Revolution (Weinberg and Eubank, 2006). At that historical juncture the term was used to 
refer to a time (1793-1794) during the revolution when the Jacobins, a radical group, who 
controlled the government, executed thousands of people at the guillotine whom they 
considered as threats of the revolution (Ibid). Since then, the term has been used to refer 
different forms of political violence by different actors. However, the modern usage of the 
term, ―developed in the mid-twentieth century, regards terrorism as a tool of ethnic and 
religious fanatics to serve political ends, such as liberation from an alien occupying group, or 
simply to exact righteous vengeance against a group labeled as a threat or enemy‖ (Forst, 
2009:3).  
 As its meaning, labelling the perpetrator of the act as a terrorist is also debatable. This 
is to say that what is a terrorist for one group may be a freedom fighter for the other. Needless 
to say, some individuals who involved in a "liberation" struggle were labelled as "terrorists" 
by the Western governments or media. Later, the same individuals, as leaders of the liberated 
nations, were called "statesmen" by Western governments. Two examples of this 
phenomenon were the Nobel Peace Prize laureates Menachem Begin and Nelson Mandela. 
 There are many definitions given to terrorism by different authorities. For instance, in 
November 2004, the United Nations Secretary General report described terrorism as any act 
"intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the 
purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any act". Still others define it as a political violence 
in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and indiscriminate psychological 
fear through the violent victimization and destruction of non-combatant targets. Such acts are 
meant to send a message from an illicit clandestine organization. The purpose of terrorism is 
to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force 
multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience(s) to achieve short- and midterm 
political goals and/or desired long-term end states (Held, 2008). What distinguishes terrorism 
from other forms of political violence and war is the deliberate killings of innocent people 
and this has been widely considered as the central characteristics that defines terrorism.    
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 For the purpose of this paper we have used Seumas Miller‘s (2009:36) definition of 
terrorism. According to him, terrorism is a ―political or military strategy that consists of 
violent actions directed against civilians involving such methods as assassination (targeted 
killings), indiscriminate killing, torture, hostage taking, kidnapping, ethnic cleansing and the 
use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in order to cause some other group to do what 
they otherwise might not have done‖. In his definition, he underscores that terrorism is a 
strategy used by state or non-state actors to engender widespread fear in the target political or 
social groups and to achieve a political goal. Generally, terrorism has been carried out in 
different forms by different actors.  
 
Types of Terrorism within the IGAD Region  
 The IGAD region is one of the most volatile and conflict-ridden parts of the world 
(Kinfe, 2006). Some commentators describe it as the hot-bet of the world. The region has 
been the epi-centre of continental instability and humanitarian catastrophe. States of the 
region experienced authoritarian regimes which massacred thousands of people. They also 
undergone through conflicts over ethnic identity, resources and boundary questions 
(Medhane, 2004, Wood Ward, 1996). Thus, the region has seen very little of democratic 
governance and economic development. Furthermore, the IGAD region is also drought, 
famine and refugees affected area of the globe. Among other things, terrorism has been of the 
great security challenges of the IGAD region. According to David Shinn (2003) the region 
has seen three types of terrorism. Each type varies mainly on the basis of the nature of the 
terrorist organizations and the objectives they sought to achieve.  
 The first type of terrorism is an acts perpetrated by organizations outside the region. 
This type of terrorism is usually known as international terrorism. The organizations which 
are perpetrating the acts either be states, non-state actors or the combination of the two. By 
their very nature, the terrorists are not indigenous to the region. Their primary goal is not to 
injure the country where the terrorist attack takes place; rather it is designed to harm a third 
party which is the target of the act. The assassination attempt by the Palestinian terrorist 
group Black September in 1973 of the American Ambassador and a Belgian diplomat in 
Khartoum is a typical example of a terrorism act that falls in this category. The attempted 
assassination against the then Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, in 1995 in Addis Ababa by 
the Egyptian terrorist group Gama'at al-Islamiyya is also an example of this kind. Other 
examples include the bombing by al-Qaeda in 1998 of the American embassies in Dares 
Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, and the simultaneous al-Qaeda attacks at Mombasa, 
Kenya, in 2002 against an Israeli airliner and bombing of an Israeli owned hotel popular with 
Israeli tourists (Molla, 2000:43-44).  
 The second type is an act committed by organizations within the region. It is 
conducted by organizations in the region against neighbouring countries. Example of this type 
include, a series of attacks carried out by Somalia-based al-Ittihad al-Islamia/Al-shabbab 
against civilian targets in Ethiopia in the 1990s (Medhane, 2002). The terrorist acts that have 
been committed by same organization in Kenya and Uganda also fall under this category.  
 The third type is a terrorist acts instigated by insurgent groups fighting the 
government within a particular state. These groups aim to either control the government, 
influence the policy of the government towards the people they are fighting for or greater 
autonomy (secession) or to change the regime by deliberately attacking and harming civilian 
population (Held, 2008). They generally are not aimed at a third party. Example of this 
category includes insurgent groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Allied 
Democratic Front (ADF) in Uganda and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia, which committed terrorist attacks in Uganda and 
Ethiopia respectively (Medhane, 2004).  
European Scientific Journal  September 2014  /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.2   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
221 
 It is crystal clear that the most common and dominant form of trans-national terrorism 
in the IGAD region has been the second type; an act of terror committed by organization 
operating within the region. Al-shabbab has been the major terrorist organizations operating 
within the IGAD region. It declared itself as an al-Qaeda affiliated organization with the 
primary objective of establishing an Islamic republic state in Somalia (Menkhaus, 2005). 
With the gradual erosion of the power of factional leaders in Somalia and due to the absence 
of effective regional or inter-regional political force, it came to dominate the political 
dynamics in Somalia in 2006 and controlled the entire parts of Mogadishu. 
 It is apparent that the 2006 Ethiopia‘s intervention in Somalia by the invitation of the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia had broken the backbone of AIAI and 
consequently it fractured into several segments. Ethiopian‘s primary objective was to crush 
AIAI, and to deter the spread of political Islam in the region (Medhane, 2002:155). The 
evacuation of the Ethiopian military force in 2008 had created a fertile ground for Al-shabbab 
to revive and to regain its dominance in the South-central part of Somalia including the 
capital, Mogadishu. Although Al-Shabbab was driven out from its strong hold by AMISOM, 
it still remains a great security threat not only to Somalia but also to the entire IGAD region. 
It is enough to note the recent terrorist attacks in Kenya, Westgate, and in other areas 
perpetrated by Al-Shabbab to recognize how it is challenging the peace and security of the 
region. The fight against Al-Shabbab requires regional coordination of resources and sharing 
of intelligence information. 
 
IGAD and the Fight against Terrorism  
 As mentioned elsewhere above, IGAD has been involved in preventing and combating 
terrorism. In the following sections we shall deal with the conventions, institutional 
mechanisms and programs introduced with the purpose of preventing and combating 
terrorism. Following that, we shall see the practical activities that IGD performed in its 
attempt to preventing and fighting terrorism.  
 
Conventions/ Treaties and Institutional Mechanisms  
 Terrorism is perceived as a present challenge and an eminent threat to the sub-region. 
Since 1990s, terrorism has increasingly threatened the security of the IGAD region. The 
major acts of transnational terrorism in the IGAD region emanates from Somalia, a state that 
has been virtually ―failed‖ to provide security since the downfall of the Siad Barre 
government. Somalia‘s geographic location and its failure to function as an effective 
sovereign state has created an opportunity for several Al-Qaeda linked terrorists from North 
Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to establish Al-Qaeda cell in the region. Here is what 
United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA) has to say how acts of 
transnational terrorism in the IGAD region have been emanating from Somalia:  
―Al-Qaida and al-Shabaab pose serious terrorist threats to the countries of the 
Horn of Africa, destabilizing the sub-region. Somali territory provides safe haven 
for terrorists and is used by them as a recruiting and training ground for terrorists. 
It was from the Somali territory that the 1998 terrorist attacks on the US 
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were launched. Al-Shabaab now controls and 
operates in a vast area of Somali territory, which also provides safe haven and 
staging ground for pirates plaguing international shipping in the Indian Ocean off 
the Horn of Africa‖ (UN-OSAA,nd:38). 
 Recognizing transnational nature terrorism, IGAD member states agreed that no 
individual member can single-handedly be able to deal it effectively (CGCC and ISSP, 2012). 
Consequently, the Draft Implementation Plan to Counter Terrorism was adopted by IGAD in 
2003 in Kampala, Uganda, with the purpose of combating terrorism. It was the first major 
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step towards legal cooperation against terrorism taken by IGAD. It called on member states to 
work towards a common legal framework, develop extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance 
(MLA) treaties, and encouraged ratification of relevant continental and international 
instruments. The plan also called for increased information exchange, training coordination, 
and international cooperation and highlighted the importance of respecting human rights 
while countering terrorism (Ibid).  
 In late 2009, acting on a desire to implement the United Nations Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy in the region, the IGAD Council of Ministers adopted two new 
Conventions, one on Extradition, and the other on MLA. Another further step taken by IGAD 
in combating terrorism was the adoption of the Security Strategy in 2010. With its adoption, 
IGAD restructured what was known as IGAD Capacity Building Programme Against 
Terrorism (ICPATP) and established the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy (IPSS). The 
transformation of ICPATP to ISSP was motivated by the recognition of the changes in 
security situation in the region that includes a convergence of various transnational crimes. 
ISSP has four pillars: Counter-terrorism (CT), Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), 
Maritime Security (MS) and Security Institutions Capacity Building (SICB) (Capital, 2013).  
 IGAD Member state as well ratified several international conventions on combating 
terrorism. The major ones among them are the UN Convention for the Suppression of 
Financing Terrorism and the AU Convention for the Prevention of Terrorism (CGCC and 
ISSP, 2012). IGAD member States have also ratified the following key legal documents of 
AU‘s Counter-Terrorism Initiatives: The 1999 Algiers Convention (the OAU, 1999); 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism; The 2002 AU Plan of Action for 
the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa (AU, 2002), and The 2004 Protocol to 
the Algiers Convention (AU, 2004; Wani, 2007; Wesi and Aning, 2006 and Ford, 2011). In 
addition to acceding to global, regional and sub-regional treaties on counter-terrorism, IGAD 
member states have been introducing legal codes that help them in fighting terrorism and 
other transnational crimes at national level (CGCC and ISSP, 2012). 
 Currently, IGAD has a program unit established to handle issues of security. This unit 
is called the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP). The ISSP replaced  ICPAT and is 
mandated with enhancing ―the capacity of IGAD member states to combat terrorism, to deal 
with maritime security threats, contain the intensity and impact of organized crime, and 
provide security efficiently and effectively through security sector reform with capacity 
building as an overarching component‖ (CGCC and ISSP, 2012:13). IGAD also works in 
collaboration with the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO). 
 IGAD has also been working with the USA led Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of 
Africa (CJTF -HOA) in its attempt to combat terrorism. The CJTF –HOA‘s mission is to 
detect, disrupt, defeat and deny terrorist activity in the Horn of Africa. The CJTF -HOA is a 
joint and combined effort of personnel from all US services and allied officers from 
numerous other countries, such as Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. CJTF -HOA provided 
military training to Ethiopia, Uganda, and Djibouti; and trained the navies of Kenya and 
Djibouti (Nzau, 2010).  
 
Practical Activities    
 IGAD through IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT) has 
been engaged in developing program aimed at counter-terrorism capacity building of its 
member states and promote regional security cooperation. In 2006, ICPAT launched a four-
year programme in Addis Ababa called the now replaced by ISSP. IGAD‘s counter-terrorism 
program targets five areas: (a) enhancing judicial capacity; (b) working to promote greater 
inter-agency coordination on counter-terrorism within individual IGAD member states; (c) 
enhancing border control; (d) providing training, sharing information and best practices; and 
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(e) promoting strategic cooperation. In this regard, IGAD‘s program is often held up as an 
example for other African Regional Economic Communities to emulate (UNOSAA, nd).  
 IGAD through its ICPAT/ISSP and in collaboration with international organizations 
have been performing the following practical activities with the intention of combating 
terrorism and to ensure peace and security in the IGAD region. 
 
Working on Democracy, Development and Interconnectedness  
 The structural problems on which terrorism strive is attributed to poverty, 
unemployment, ignorance, bad governance, disorder, insecurity (Nzau, 2010), extremist 
ideology and lack of tolerance (Shinn, 2008) as well as state failure. Recognizing the roots of 
terrorism and with objective of reducing its impact on the peace and security of the region, 
IGAD has been working on democratizing its member states. This is particularly important 
because, domestic terrorism in the region emanates mainly from acts of marginalization, 
exclusion and bad governance. This is particularly true in Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and 
Sudan where several aspects of conflict have led to armed insurgency and outbreaks of 
domestic terrorism (Glenshaw, 1994).  
 Moreover, IGAD has been working hard by designing policies that prevents drought 
from turning into famine and strengthening interconnectedness among its members through 
trade and infrastructure. To realize this, IGAD delegated its member states to play a leading 
role in the implementations of its projects. Accordingly, Ethiopia is delegated to lead the 
construction of trans-boundary infrastructure; Kenya on drought resilience and resource 
management; Uganda on peace and security issue; Djibouti on maritime security and Sudan 
on trade harmonization (Chatham House, 2014). No doubt, if properly implemented, these 
projects will have a significant contribution to minimizing acts of terrorism in the region.   
 To prevent state collapse and insecurity, IGAD has been working on conflict 
prevention, mediation and capacity building between member states. In this regard, IGAD 
was highly involved in the Sudan peace process that culminated in the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and later in the process of holding South Sudan‘s 
referendum. IGAD has also held a long-lasting role in the reestablishment of sovereign 
government in Somalia (Ibid).  
 
Provision of training to the security sector 
 Since 2006, training projects and seminars were designed by the ICPAT to enhance 
the knowledge and skills of officials working in the security sectors of IGAD member states 
(defense force, police force, border guards, and intelligence service and justice institutions) 
and to enhance their familiarity with working together to solve shared problems. Accordingly, 
the following training and/or seminars were conducted.  
 In 2008, the ICPAT, in collaboration with the EAPCCO, has delivered Training on 
―Counter-Terrorism‖ for selected Ethiopian law enforcement officials. The same training was 
given in Uganda, Somalia and Sudan for similar officials (IGAD, 2008). On May 13 and 14, 
2009, IGAD, in collaboration with United Nations Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate 
(UNCED), organized a seminar on ―border security‖, in Kampala, Uganda. IGAD member 
states were represented by ―officials from ministries of foreign affairs, law enforcement and 
counter terrorism agencies, and customs authorities‖ (ICPAT, 2009). The seminar was 
focusing on enhancing border security (including the introduction of community policing) 
and the coordination of counter-terrorism (Ibid).  
 Furthermore, from 18-21st October 2011, ISSP organized a 4 days training seminar on 
―Advanced Interrogation Skills in Counter Terrorism‖ in Kampala, Uganda. According to the 
ISSP, the training was  ―a follow up of the series of trainings provided by ICPAT and CGCC 
that focused on the implementation of the IGAD Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance 
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Conventions and the strengthening of cross-border cooperation networks amongst law 
enforcement officials in IGAD states‖(ISSP, 2011). In this training, officials from member 
states were ―drawn from the National Security Services, Police, National Counter Terrorism 
Centres and Magistrate‖ (Ibid). Moreover, in the same year, the following trainings were 
given to counter terrorism practitioners of IGAD member states:  ―Lessons Learned From 
Investigating Terrorism Incidents,‖ Nairobi, 18–20 May 2011; ―Open Source Analysis and 
Information Sharing,‖ Nairobi, 14–16 June 2011; ―Community Engagement to Counter 
Terrorism,‖ Addis Ababa, 14–16 July 2011; and ―Advanced Interrogation Skills in Counter-
Terrorism,‖ Kampala, 18–21 October 2011 (CGCC and ISSP, 2012).   
 From May 22-23, 2012, the ISSP, in collaboration with CGCC, organized annual 
convention for counter terrorism practitioners who came from the IGAD member states, 
Tanzania, Yemen and other stakeholders involved in counter-terrorism.  Here participants 
discussed on ―trends and outlook of the threat of terrorism in Eastern Africa, strengthening 
the legal cooperation and building partnership against terrorism, strengthening regional 
financial infrastructure, new approaches of tackling terrorism in Somalia, and the human 
rights as a necessary condition for effective counter terrorism‖ (Ibid: 2012:1).  
 From 27-28 March 2013, ISSP in collaboration with the Global Counter Terrorism 
Forum (GCTF) organized a training that brought together senior prosecutors and police 
officers from IGAD countries in Uganda. The training was mainly designed to enhance the 
knowledge of the trainees from good practices and case studies on effective counter terrorism 
in the criminal justice sector. Witness and victim protection, interagency cooperation, 
incentives to terrorist suspects to cooperate and investigating and prosecuting preparatory 
offences were the principle topics of the training (ISSP and GCTF, 2013). 
 Finally, the ISSP, on April 14, 2014 and March 20, 2014, organized a one day 
workshop ―International Instruments to Counter-terrorism‖ for Kenyan and Ethiopia senior 
counter-terrorism officials respectively (ISSP, 2014). So far, more than 300 law enforcing 
personnel from IGAD member states were trained (Ibid).   
 
Facilitating and backing (unilateral or collective) interventions against terrorists in 
Somalia.  
 On March 2006, IGAD mandated Ethiopia and Uganda to deploy a peacekeeping 
force in Somaliato fight the Union of Islamic Court (Rosand, et al, 2012). IGAD deployed the 
Peace and support mission in Somalia (IGASOM) which was the precursor to the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007. It played a major role in facilitating and 
persuading the UN and AU to intervene in Somalia. Although AMISOM is AU‘s 
peacekeeping mission in Somalia, IGAD member states are the chief contributors and 
AMISOM operates in close collaboration with IGAD (Chatham House, 2014). Moreover, 
IGAD backed the unilateral intervention of Ethiopia in 2006 and Kenya in 2011. For 
example, in its 19
th
 extra-ordinary meeting the IGAD Assembly of Head of States and 
Governments welcomed the unilateral intervention of Kenya to fight Al-shabbab jointly with 
Somali‘s Transitional Federal Government troops. According to the communiqué released 
from the meeting, IGAD ―understands, appreciates and supports‖ the joint operation and 
Kenya‘s move against Al-shabbab and sees it as ―unique opportunity‖ to ―restore stability and 
security‖ in Somalia (IGAD, 2011). Commentators argue that IGAD has been resorting to 
hard power in its fight against terrorism. Thus, IGAD has been very active in attracting the 
attention of the international community concerning the crisis of Somalia in general and the 
situation of terrorism in the IGAD region in particular.  It has also been involved in 
mobilizing financial, material and human resources in fighting international terrorist in 
Somalia.  
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Sanctions, Travel and Financial Bans and Extradition 
 As a fighting strategy against terrorismin the region, IGAD has been introducing 
sanctions, including travel and financial bans on suspected terrorists and individuals or 
organizations suspected of supporting terrorists. IGAD has also been calling up on the AU 
and the UN to take similar actions. In this regard, in June 2006, IGAD Council of Ministers 
(IGAD-CM) ratified a Kenya-led travel ban on Somali warlords. Furthermore, in its 33
rd
 
extraordinary session held on May 29, 2009, IGAD-CM passed the following resolution.  
 Recognizing the fact that Al-Shabbab and other international terrorists have used the 
porous borders of Somali specially the airports at KM 50 and KM 90 to receive supplies of 
arms and ammunitions, and personnel from their foreign backers, IGAD calls upon United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) to impose a non-fly zone, except for humanitarian 
purposes authorized by the Somalia government, on the airport of Kismayo, baidoa, KM 50, 
Balidoogle, Waajid, Hudur, all airports in Gedo, Isaley and Johwar. On the same session, 
IGAD-CM also called up the UNSC to impose blockage on sea ports, particularly on 
Kismayo and Merka, to prevent the further in-flow of arms and foreign fighters, and urges the 
UNSC to reach out to the international naval forces present in the region to enforce   the 
blockade.  
 The council also reiterated to take the necessary action to impose targeted sanctions, 
including travel bans, freezing of assets among others, against all those in and outside of 
Somalia and calls up the AU and the UNSC to do the same (IGAD, 2009). In the sprite of the 
IGAD-CM resolution 2009, the National Bank of Ethiopia has blocked individual bank 
accounts, detected at the Harar branch of Dashen Bank and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, 
linked with the Barakat International Companies (BICO), which is known to be involved in 
the financing of terrorist activities in 2011 (IGAD, 2013). 
 Due to the initiatives developed by IGAD concerning extradition and Multi-Legal 
Assistance, there have been formal and informal extraditions of terrorist suspects. For 
example, suspects from Kenya were moved informally to Uganda following the July 2010 
terrorist bombings in Kampala; there was a formal extradition process for suspects from 
Kenya to Uganda. There was also an informal extradition of suspects from Kenya to Ethiopia  
(CGCC and ISSP, 2012:13). 
 
Rebuilding the Somali State 
 Somalia has been the epi-center of terrorism and source of international terrorism in 
the IGAD region. This is because Somalia has been unable to ensure its internal security and 
to control its borders as well as protect its territory from local and international terrorist. 
Thus, rebuilding Somalia‘s security apparatus and reinstating a sovereign legitimate 
government in Somalia has been one of the major priorities of IGAD in fighting terrorism in 
the region. Accordingly, via its member states, IGAD has been providing various trainings to 
Somali security forces. Until the end of 2013, ―between 14,700 and 15,000 troops had already 
been trained by IGAD countries‖ (Mahaboub Maalim, executive secretary of IGAD, quoted 
in Rift Valley Institute (RVI), 2013). It also supported Somalia to develop about five major 
policy frameworks expected to contribute to uprooting terrorism and ensuring lasting peace in 
Somalia. 
 One of the major policy document developed with support of IGAD is ―the Somali 
government‘s 2016 Vision for Somalia, which outlines the process for creating a Somali 
federal system, removing Al-Shabbab, and holding elections in 2016‖ (Ibid, 2013:1). 
However, IGAD‘s involvement in Somalia is criticized for not doing enough due to lack of 
capacity and competitive national interest of member states and weak collaboration with civil 
society organizations (Farah and Halima quoted in RVI, 2013:2).  
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 Finally, it should be acknowledge that the US, EU and several European states 
(unilaterally) have been funding the various trainings given to Somalia security forces by 
IGAD member states under the auspices of IGAD. In some cases European, U.S and Turkish 
security personnel were directly involved in the provision of the training (Amnesty 
International, 2010). Moreover, the US played its own role in fighting terrorists in Somalia by 
conducting air raids in different areas, particularly since 2007.   
 
Challenges  
 IGAD has been facing several challenges in its attempt fighting against terrorism. The 
first major challenge is lack of trust among member states due to the legacy of inter-state and 
intra-state conflict. The IGAD region is characterized by endemic inter-state and intra-state 
conflict. Some IGAD member state were and (still are) supporting or hosting each other‘s 
rebel groups (including those classified as terrorist groups) fighting a neighboring member 
state. Such acts happened between Ethiopia and Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea (still happening) 
Sudan and Eritrea, Uganda and Sudan (Kidist, 2009). IGAD states have been showing 
competing national interest over the Somalia civil war and towards the Al-Qaeda liked 
terrorist and other Islamists in Somalia. For example, in 2006, ―IGAD warned particularly 
Ethiopia and Eritrea from taking unilateral actions that undermine the powerless but 
internationally recognized TFG‖ (The East African, 2006, cited in Nazau, 2010:6). All such 
experiences might have made it difficult for IGAD states to fight domestic and international 
terrorists effectively.    
 The second major challenge comes from the difference on the definition of terrorist 
organization and lack of cooperation among member states in fighting domestic terrorism. 
Due to the dynamic nature of terrorism, member states do not have common definition on   
what constitutes terrorism and who is a terrorist. Moreover, while majority of terrorism in the 
IGAD region do not constitute international terrorism, as a regional body, IGAD has been 
focusing on terrorist acts emanating from Islamic fundamentalist and Al-Qaeda linked 
terrorists operating in Somalia. However, the vast terrorist acts in the IGAD region has been 
committed by groups labelled as domestic ―terrorist‖ in the respective countries, where IGAD 
had no significant role in abating it. Such terrorist acts were committed by the Lord 
Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the Janjaweed in Sudan, and Al-shebab in Somalia and 
[the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in 
Ethiopia] (Ibid).  
 The third challenge is attributed to overreliance on hard power and extrajudicial 
options in dealing with terrorism. However, the presence of Al-Qaeda linked Al-shabbab and 
other Islamic fundamentalists in Somalia indicate that hard power may not succeed in 
uprooting both domestic and international terrorism in the region.       
 The fourth challenge is related to external intervention in Somalia both from IGAD 
member states and from outside the region.  The unilateral intervention of Ethiopia in 2006 
and Kenya in 2011, which were implicitly supported by the West has been perceived as a 
fight on clash of civilization instead of a combat against terrorist threat in Somalia. Moreover, 
the fact that the U.S has been carrying out air-rids in Somalia and the fact that the U.S, E.U 
and several European states have been behind the trainings given to Somalia‘s Transitional 
Government security forces as well as other State rebuilding process have been giving an 
impetus to local and international terrorists in Somalia to commit more terrorist acts in the 
IGAD region including by recruiting new personnel (Shinn, 2013).  
 Other challenges include, weak integration of broader legal and policy frameworks, 
lack of financial capacity, coordinated intelligence analysis and policy making capabilities, 
the withdrawal of Eritrea from IGAD and the nature of the Eritrean government as well as the 
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modern digital communication has also made terrorism and other transnational crimes vastly 
easier to coordinate on a worldwide scale (Sims, 2007). 
 
Conclusion  
 IGADD was established in 1986 to combat the spread of drought and desertification in 
the Horn of Africa. But, it transformed itself into a full-fledged regional political, economic 
and security authority (IGAD) in 1996 recognizing the need to maintain peace and security 
for sustainable economic development and regional integration. However, terrorism has still 
remained as a challenging and destabilizing factor for the peace and security networks of the 
region. Although IGAD has been fighting terrorism by introducing various conventions and 
institutional mechanisms, it remained as major security threats of the region. 
 IGAD has been overlaying on hard power and external assistance in its fight against 
terrorism. Therefore, the authority must direct resources to combat TTC by galvanizing its 
member states. Moreover, it should focus on issues of political marginalization and 
polarization, social and economic inequality, endemic poverty, pervasive corruption, bad 
governance, lack of tolerance and extremist ideologies, which Shinn (2008:1) argues are ―all 
greater threats than terrorism to the political stability and economic progress in the Horn of 
Africa". 
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